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Abstract 
Failing to practice what you preach is often condemned as hypocrisy in the West. Three 
experiments and a field survey document less negative interpersonal reactions to misalignment 
between practicing and preaching in cultures encouraging individuals’ interdependence (Asian 
and Latin American) than in those encouraging independence (North American and Western 
Europe). In Studies 1–3, target people received greater moral condemnation for a misdeed when 
it contradicted the values they preached than when it did not – but this effect was smaller among 
participants from Indonesia, India, and Japan than among participants from the USA. In Study 4, 
employees from 46 nations rated their managers. Overall, the more that employees perceived a 
manager’s words and deeds as chronically misaligned, the less they trusted him or her – but the 
more employees’ national culture emphasized interdependence, the weaker this effect became. 
We posit that these cultural differences in reactions to failures to practice what one preaches 
arise because people are more likely to view the preaching as other-oriented and generous (vs. 
selfish and hypocritical) in cultural contexts that encourage interdependence. Study 2 provided 
meditational evidence of this possibility. We discuss implications for managing intercultural 
conflict, and for theories about consistency, hypocrisy, and moral judgment. 
 
Keywords: hypocrisy; social judgment; morality; culture; behavioral integrity; inconsistency  
 
  
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  4 
Hypocrisy and Culture: 
Failing to Practice What You Preach Receives  
Harsher Interpersonal Reactions in Independent (vs. Interdependent) Cultures 
 Practicing what you preach is not always easy. For example, leaders may struggle to 
enact policies that fit their stated ideals, and employees may feel obligated to pay lip service at 
work to values that do not guide their behavior at home. In Western cultural contexts, failing to 
practice what you preach can have grave interpersonal consequences. The present research 
examines the possibility that outside the West, misaligned practicing and preaching seems more 
appropriate and has less severe consequences. Specifically, we predict that people react less 
negatively to such misalignment in cultures encouraging individuals’ independence (e.g., North 
America and Western Europe) compared to cultures encouraging individuals’ interdependence 
(e.g., Asian and Latin America).  
In Western contexts, “failing to practice what you preach” is often judged as hypocrisy 
(Stone & Fernandez, 2008), so it is no surprise it elicits negative reactions. For example, it can 
be seen as hypocritical to “say one thing but do another” (Barden, Rucker, & Petty, 2005), or to 
excuse yourself while condemning others for the same misdeed (Lammers, 2012; Lammers, 
Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; Polman & Ruttan, 2012; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008). Research 
in the West has focused on two negative interpersonal consequences of misaligned practicing 
and preaching. The first is moral condemnation. Vignette experiments show that the same 
misdeed seems more hypocritical and thus receives greater moral condemnation when it 
contradicts values the transgressor has previously endorsed than when it does not (Barden, et al., 
2005; Barden, Rucker, Petty, & Rios, 2014; Effron, Lucas, & O'Connor, 2015; Jordan, Sommers, 
Bloom, & Rand, 2017; Laurent, Clark, Walker, & Wiseman, 2013; Powell & Smith, 2012). For 
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example, an academic might seem less moral and more deserving of punishment for committing 
plagiarism if she had previously given a speech about the importance of academic integrity than 
if she had not. The second interpersonal consequence is distrust. Field studies show that when 
employees perceive managers as chronically “saying one thing but doing another,” they distrust 
the managers, which dampens the employees’ motivation, organizational commitment, and 
performance (for a review, see Simons, Leroy, Collewaert, & Masschelein, 2014).  
Although this previous research often equates hypocrisy with inconsistency, the two are 
actually distinct constructs (Monin & Merritt, 2012). We distinguish between failures to practice 
what you preach – termed word-deed misalignment (Simons, 2002) – and hypocrisy, which we 
view as a morally discrediting attribution for such misalignment (cf. Cha & Edmondson, 2006). 
Specifically, we argue misalignment seems hypocritical only if it appears motivated by a self-
serving desire seem more virtuous than you really are (cf. Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, 
Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). When people attribute word-deed misalignment to a different 
motive, they view it as less hypocritical and condemn it less severely (Barden, et al., 2005; 
Barden, et al., 2014). For example, when a person advises others to “do as I say, not as I’ve 
done,” observers tend not to listen because they view her advice as hypocritical – unless she has 
suffered for what she has done. In that case, they interpret her advice as a genuine attempt to help 
them and are more inclined to listen (Effron & Miller, 2015). More generally, the same act of 
misalignment can seem more hypocritical or more benign, depending on the situations in which 
it occurs. We propose that culture, like situations, powerfully shape how people understand 
word-deed misalignment. Such misalignment may not seem as hypocritical – and thus not elicit 
the same degree of negative interpersonal reactions – in all cultural contexts.   
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Some theoretical perspectives imply that word-deed misalignment will have negative 
interpersonal consequences in all cultures. A person who preaches without practicing a value can 
be seen as sending a “false signal” about his or her morality (Jordan, et al., 2017). A tendency to 
respond to such false signals with moral condemnation and distrust should help people in all 
societies avoid exploitation by individuals who merely appear benevolent. Also, evolutionary 
pressures may have created a fundamental human aversion to false moral signals, because early 
humans’ survival depended in part on their ability to avoid exploitation (Kurzban, 2010). Finally, 
violating a value that one expects others to follow could seem unfair, which would violate moral 
codes across cultures (Graham et al., 2011).  
However, we propose that aversion to word-deed misalignment arises in some important 
part from culturally grounded assumptions about the nature of the self and the drivers of human 
behavior. These assumptions are reflected in models of self – elements of culture revealed and 
fostered in individuals’ psychological tendencies, in everyday social interactions and norms, in 
institutional policies, and in pervasive cultural ideas and values (Markus, 2016; Markus & 
Kitayama, 2003; Stephens, Fryberg, Markus, Johnson, & Covarrubias, 2012). These models 
guide people’s behavior and shape how they understand and explain others’ actions. 
According to the independent model, the self has a true essence, is defined by internal 
attributes, and is separate from social contexts (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; 
Lillard, 1998; Markus & Conner, 2014; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Riemer, Shavitt, Koo, & 
Markus, 2014; Triandis, 1995). This model assumes a person’s core identity remains constant 
across time and situations, even if he or she does not always behave the same way. The 
interdependent model, by contrast, defines the self by social roles, relationships, norms, and 
contexts (Fiske, et al., 1998; Lillard, 1998; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Riemer, et al., 2014; 
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Triandis, 1995). Because each person occupies multiple social roles, acts in different contexts, 
and owes attention, concern and loyalty to multiple individuals and groups, an interdependent 
self must be flexible and fluid across time and situations. Although all cultures require and foster 
both independence and interdependence, the independent model is more prominent and 
normatively sanctioned in the West (i.e., North America and Western Europe), whereas the 
interdependent model is more prominent and sanctioned in the non-Western cultures that 
characterize most of the world (Arnett, 2008; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Markus & 
Conner, 2014). 
We propose that the independent model fosters more negative reactions than the 
interdependent model to people who fail to practice what they preach because each model 
suggests a different interpretation of the preaching. A negative interpretation is that their 
preaching has the selfish aim of creating the false appearance of virtue (i.e., hypocrisy). For 
example, an employee might publicly promote safety regulations despite privately ignoring them 
because she wants to earn a promotion, seem superior to her coworkers, or deflect attention from 
her shortcomings. A more positive explanation ascribes the preaching to generous, other-oriented 
intentions. For example, the employee may not personally care about safety, but promote it 
anyway because she wants to help her colleagues avoid punishment for violations, to bolster her 
organization’s reputation, or to help her boss implement a safety initiative. According to such 
explanations, word-deed misalignment reflects a willingness to put others before the self rather 
than implying hypocrisy.  
The negative explanation for preaching, with its emphasis on selfishness and hypocrisy, 
resonates with the independent model of self. To believe a person’s preaching reflects feigned 
virtue requires drawing a distinction between how virtuous people “truly” are and how virtuous 
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their public behavior is. This distinction is ingrained in the independent model’s view that the 
self has a true essence separate from social contexts. The multiple faces a person chooses to 
show to the world are like masks, concealing the true self. The distinction between apparent and 
actual virtue makes less sense in the interdependent model, in which social contexts are defining 
elements of self. According to this model, virtue does not only come from within, but is 
bestowed by other people based on public behavior. The multiple faces a person must show to 
the world do not mask but constitute the self. For example, Japanese distinguish between the 
public or “front self” (omote) and the private or “back self” (ura). Importantly, both selves are 
authentic, and knowing when to restrain the “back” in deference to the “front” self is a valued 
skill. When the two conflict, Japanese are expected to favor the omote (Doi, 1986; Lebra, 2004; 
Riemer, et al., 2014).  
The positive explanation for preaching, with its emphasis on other-oriented intentions, 
resonates better with the interdependent model. Interdependence requires fulfilling relational 
obligations, preserving harmony, and being socially sensitive (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; 
Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004; Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002; Riemer, et 
al., 2014). To meet these requirements, people must modify their words and deeds depending on 
whom they are with – which will sometimes require preaching without practicing. Observers in 
interdependent contexts are thus likely to assume that actors’ preaching arises, at least in part, 
from other-oriented intentions. For example, in Asian cultures, “publicly agreeing, while 
privately disagreeing, with others may be seen as exemplifying tact and sensitivity rather than 
submission and cowardice” or hypocrisy (Hodges & Geyer, 2006, p. 7). 
To summarize, people could have either selfish or generous reasons for preaching a value 
despite not practicing it. Observers in all cultures are capable of entertaining both types of 
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reasons when seeking to explain an actor’s behavior. However, we expect the selfish reasons to 
be more plausible and salient to actors in cultures that encourage independence. Given cultural 
differences in how people interpret word-deed misalignment, we expect cultural differences in 
how negatively people react to it. Specifically, we formulated the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis: Word-deed misalignment will provoke greater moral condemnation and 
distrust in cultures that emphasize independence relative to those that emphasize 
interdependence. 
 
To our knowledge, we are the first to test this prediction. In so doing, we build on 
previous work documenting cultural differences in how people think about inconsistency. People 
in Asia are less likely than people in the West to expect themselves and others to act consistently 
across situations (Choi & Nisbett, 2000; English & Chen, 2007). Among people who hold a more 
interdependent model of self, cross-situational inconsistency is less predictive of well-being 
(Church et al., 2014; Cross, Gore, & Morris, 2003; Suh, 2002). In Asian versus Western cultures, 
making choices that appear inconsistent with personal preferences is more common (Savani, 
Markus, & Conner, 2008), and does not arouse as much cognitive dissonance (Heine & Lehman, 
1997; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Kitayama, et al., 2004). Finally, the dialectical mode of 
reasoning associated with interdependence embraces contradiction and paradox, unlike the 
analytical mode of reasoning associated with independence (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 
2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). 
We go beyond this prior work on culture and inconsistency in several ways. The type of 
inconsistency we examine – between words and deeds – has not been considered in previous 
cultural research, which has instead focused on inconsistencies between preferences and choices 
(e.g., Hoshino-Browne, et al., 2005), among logical propositions (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), or 
among actions across situations (e.g., Choi & Nisbett, 2000). Perhaps because of this focus, 
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previous research, unlike the present work, has not delved into on the negative interpersonal 
consequences of inconsistency, and how they might differ by culture. Instead, prior work has 
focused on intrapersonal consequences like cognitive dissonance and wellbeing.  
Our work also contributes to research on how culture shapes the explanations people 
provide for others’ behavior. Previous research suggests that people are more likely to attribute 
behavior to dispositions, instead of situations, in Western than in Asian cultures (e.g., Choi, 
Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994). We move beyond this disposition/situation 
dichotomy, which has been criticized for failing to capture how laypeople actually explain 
behavior (Malle, 1999, 2011; see also Stephens, Hamedani, Markus, Bergsieker, & Eloul, 2009), 
in four ways. First, we examine whether culture affects negative interpersonal reactions (i.e., 
moral condemnation and distrust), which research on culture and attribution has neglected. 
Second, we propose that culture affects whether people attribute preaching to selfish or generous 
motives, which is orthogonal to the disposition/situation distinction. Helpful or selfish motives 
for preaching could be mapped onto dispositions or situations (e.g., “she is a helpful/selfish 
person” vs. “her work environment causes her to act helpfully/selfishly”). Third, it is difficult to 
derive our hypothesis from the possibility that people in independent cultural contexts are more 
likely to attribute preaching to dispositions, because not all dispositional attributions would 
provoke condemnation and undermine trust. For example, someone who preaches 
environmentalism but does not always recycle could be the kind of person who truly values the 
environment despite not always acting “green,” or who merely pretends to value the environment 
to signal virtue. Both possibilities are dispositional attributions for preaching, but only the 
second suggests hypocrisy and would likely provoke negative reactions. Fourth, whereas 
previous research examines how culture can affect judgments of a person’s deeds, we examine 
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how culture affects reactions to the degree of misalignment between a person’s deeds and words 
(above and beyond any cultural differences in reactions to the deeds themselves). For example, 
previous research would predict that Americans are more likely than Japanese to attribute 
reckless driving to the driver’s disposition, which could conceivably lead Americans to condemn 
the driver more harshly than Japanese. Independent of whether this cultural difference emerged, 
though, we would predict that Americans would increase their condemnation more than Japanese 
upon learning that the driver used to preach the importance of road safety. In other words, 
whereas past research on dispositional attributions predicts only a main effect of culture on social 
judgment, we are interested in the interactive effect of culture and misalignment. 
Our investigation builds theory in several other areas as well. First, we suggest that 
theories of hypocrisy judgments (e.g., Barden, et al., 2005; Effron, et al., 2015; Jordan, et al., 
2017; Simons, 2002) are based on Western assumptions about the nature of the self that do not 
fully generalize to global contexts. Thus, such misalignment may not have as negative 
interpersonal consequences everywhere in the world. Second, by investigating where word-deed 
inconsistency will seem most problematic, we shed light on what counts as hypocrisy and why it 
bothers people – a question about which current theories offer little consensus (e.g., Alicke, 
Gordon, & Rose, 2013; Graham, Meindl, Koleva, Iyer, & Johnson, 2015; Hale & Pillow, 2015; 
Monin & Merritt, 2012). If failing to practice what you preach only counts as hypocrisy when 
attributed to an attempt to feign virtue, as we claim, then it should receive less negative reactions 
in cultures where this attribution is likely less salient. Third, we extend research in cultural 
psychology by testing our hypothesis – a novel prediction based on models of self (e.g., Markus 
& Kitayama, 2010). 
The Present Research 
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 We describe four studies testing whether people react more negatively to word-deed 
misalignment in cultures emphasizing independence than in those emphasizing interdependence. 
Following previous research in the social psychology literature on judgments of misalignment 
(e.g., Effron & Monin, 2010), the negative reaction examined in Studies 1–3 was moral 
condemnation. These vignette experiments tested whether people would receive harsher moral 
condemnation for the same misdeed if they previously preached against it than if they did not, 
and whether this effect would be larger in a Western country (the US) than in three diverse Asian 
countries (Japan, India, or Indonesia). Study 2 also examined cultural differences in how people 
explained the misalignment as a potential mechanism. Importantly, the design of these studies 
isolates reactions to misalignment from reactions to misdeeds, thus ruling out the alternative 
explanation that some cultures simply react more negatively to misdeeds than others. 
Study 4 was a field survey examining culture differences in negative reactions to 
managers’ word-deed misalignment in the workplace. Following previous research in the 
organizational behavior literature on misalignment (e.g., Kannan-Narasimhan & Lawrence, 
2012; Palanski, Kahai, & Yammarino, 2011; Simons, Friedman, Liu, & McLean Parks, 2007), 
the negative reaction examined was distrust. We expected that the more misaligned employees 
perceive a manager’s words and deeds and being, the less they trust him or her, as in previous 
research (for a review, see Simons, et al., 2014). Going beyond previous research, we tested 
whether this relationship between misalignment and trust would be stronger in cultures fostering 
independence than in those fostering interdependence. To increase generalizability beyond the 
East-West comparison in Studies 1-3, Study 4 recruited participants from 46 nations, which 
allowed us to test whether participants’ reactions to misalignment depended on their home 
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country’s degree of interdependence. Study 4 also sought to isolate the role of 
independence/interdependence from other cultural variables. 
We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions for all studies (Simmons, Nelson, 
& Simonsohn, 2011). Verbatim materials are posted at https://osf.io/xy4c6/. The Online 
Supplement’s Appendix S3 also reports two additional studies, described in the General 
Discussion, that attest to Study 4’s robustness and generalizability. 
Study 1 
Study 1 examined whether people would condemn word-deed misalignment more in the 
US (an independently-oriented culture) than in India (an interdependently-oriented culture). The 
paradigm isolated reactions to misalignment from reactions to misdeeds in general. Specifically, 
participants read about a target person’s misdeed and completed a moral condemnation measure 
at two points in time: before and after learning that the target previously preached against the 
same misdeed. If people condemn word-deed misalignment above and beyond the misdeed itself, 
then we should observe an increase in condemnation from initial to final ratings. If our cultural 
hypothesis is correct, then this increase should be larger in the US than in India.  
Method 
 Participants. We recruited from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online 
marketplace (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Participants each received $0.75. In 
advance of data collection, we decided to request 100 complete responses from Americans in the 
US and 100 Indians in India; 204 people began the study and one provided insufficient data for 
analysis. By a priori decision, we excluded responses from duplicate IP addresses or MTurk IDs 
(suggesting multiple responding), from IP addresses outside of either country, from people who 
were citizens of neither country, or from those who answered at least one attention-check 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  14 
question incorrectly (described below). These exclusions left 153 people (65 Indians 88 
Americans). Indians and Americans were about the same age (Ms = 33.6 and 34.3 years, SDs = 
1.2 and 1.4), t(151) = .39, p =.700, but the Indian sample had more males (71% vs. 52%), full-
time employees (69% vs. 50%), and people who relied on MTurk as their primary source of 
income (38% vs. 13%), C2s(1) = 5.34, 5.68, and 12.57, respectively; ps = .021, = .017, and < 
.001. Controlling for these demographic differences or retaining excluded participants did not 
alter the results’ significance (see Appendix S1 in the Online Supplement).  
Procedure. After indicating their citizenship, participants read three vignettes in English 
(presented in randomized orders; see Table 1 for full text). In each vignette, they learned about 
an employee who had committed a misdeed, they provided baseline ratings of moral 
condemnation, they read that the employee had previously preached against the same misdeed, 
and they provided final moral condemnation ratings. For example, one vignette described a 
journalist who had committed plagiarism; in between baseline and final ratings, participants 
learned that she had previously led an anti-plagiarism workshop. If misalignment increases the 
condemnation of a misdeed, then final ratings should be higher than baseline ratings.  
We adapted a moral condemnation measure from previous research (Effron, et al., 2015; 
Effron & Monin, 2010). Participants evaluated the employees on six semantic differentials, with 
starred items reverse-coded: Likeable/Dislikable, Mean/Nice*, Good/Bad, Ethical/Unethical, 
Arrogant/Humble*, Immoral/Moral* (1-6 scales; a = .92 across vignettes and baseline/final 
ratings). They also indicated how much the employees should be punished (1-7 scales: 1 = not at 
all, 4 = moderately, 7 = very harshly). We analyzed this punitive sentiment measure separately 
because it had different response options than the moral condemnation items. 
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We embedded four attention-check questions throughout. Two tested comprehension of 
the vignettes (multiple-choice); two instructed participants to select a certain response option if 
they were paying attention.1 
Results and Discussion 
Our hypothesis that Americans would react more negatively than Indians to misaligned 
practicing and preaching predicts a statistical interaction between country and time, such that 
Americans increase their condemnation and punitive sentiment from baseline more than Indians 
do after learning about the preaching. To test this interaction, we computed mixed models 
regressing each dependent measure (i.e., moral condemnation and punishment) on effect codes 
for country (-1 = India; 1 = U.S.,) and time (-1 = baseline measure; 1 = final measure), their 
interaction, and two dummy codes for the three vignettes’ fixed effect, specifying an 
unstructured covariance matrix. (Because we effect-coded the independent variables, their simple 
effects can be interpreted as main effects as in ANOVA). To account for the fact that each 
participant provided ratings at two time points, we allowed random intercepts for participant and 
random slopes for time.  
The results showed that, as expected, Americans reacted more negatively to 
misalignment than Indians. The predicted interaction was significantly positive for both the 
moral condemnation measure and the punishment measure; respectively, b = .22, z = 5.03, p < 
                                                
1 At the end of the study, we also included individual-difference measures related to cultural 
traits: two pictorial measures assessing the perceived overlap between the self and others (Aron, 
Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Markus & Conner, 2014), the Singelis (1994) Self-Construal Scale, the 
sociogram task described by Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, and Uskul (2009), and two 
measures of analytic/holistic thinking (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007; Ji, Zhang, & Nisbett, 2004). 
We examined whether these measures mediated the cultural differences observed, but given the 
measures’ theoretical and methodological shortcomings (e.g., Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 
2011; Na et al., 2010; Vignoles et al., 2016) – an issue we address in the General Discussion – 
we considered these analyses exploratory. We found no evidence of mediation by these 
individual differences. 
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.001, f2 = .02 and b = .17, z = 4.06, p < .001, f2 = .02 (see Table 2 and Figure 1)2. Simple slopes 
analysis showed that Americans penalized the employees for misalignment. Specifically, they 
expressed greater moral condemnation after learning about misalignment (final ratings: M = 
4.82, SD = .83) than before (baseline ratings: M = 4.29 SD = .68), d = .69, b = .41, z = 3.55, p < 
.001, and they also expressed greater punitive sentiment after learning about misalignment (final 
ratings: M = 4.51, SD = 1.19) than before (baseline ratings: M = 3.81, SD = 1.09), d = .61, b = 
.70, z = 6.36, p < .001. Indians, by contrast, did not penalize the employees for misalignment. 
Their punishment ratings were statistically equivalent after learning about misalignment (final: 
M = 4.57, SD = 1.25) than before (baseline: M = 4.55, SD = .94), d = .01, b = .02, z  = .12, p = 
.904, and their final condemnation ratings (M = 4.31, SD = 1.34) were lower than their baseline 
ratings (M = 4.69, SD = .91), suggesting that learning about the employee’s preaching decreased 
their condemnation, d = -.33, b = -.49, z = 3.58, p < .001. Perhaps Indians gave each employee 
credit for discharging his or her professional obligation to promote a value that he or she did not 
privately endorse.  
These results support our hypothesis that Americans would increase their condemnation 
and punitive sentiment from baseline more than Indians after learning about misalignment. We 
had no predictions about whether this effect would produce a country difference in final ratings, 
because our theorizing is agnostic about baseline differences. However, it is interesting to note 
that Indians reacted more negatively at baseline than Americans (see Figure 1), b = -.39, z = 
3.08, p = .002 for condemnation and b = -.74, z = 4.05, p < .001 for punishment, and that this 
                                                
2 For the mixed model of the punishment measure to converge, we had to remove the random 
slope for time. We calculated Cohen’s f2 effect size using the methods outlined by Selya, Rose, 
Dierker, Hedeker, and Mermelstein (2012), implemented in Stata (see UCLA Statistical 
Consulting Group, n.d.). We computed ds calculated based on Ms and SDs averaged across 
vignettes. 
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difference was reversed (in the case of condemnation) or eliminated (in the case of punishment) 
after participants learned the misdeeds contradicted the employees’ preaching, b= .51, z = 2.89, p 
= .004, and b = -.06, z = .32, p = .752, respectively. 
Together, these results provide preliminary evidence that members of a more-
independent cultural group react more negatively to misalignment than a more-interdependent 
cultural group. 
Study 2 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to examine our proposed mechanism: how people explain 
preaching when it is misaligned with practicing. We expected people from a more independent 
cultural context (the US) to impute more selfish motives for the preaching than people from a 
more interdependent cultural context (India). This cultural difference, in turn, should predict how 
much people condemned the failure to practice. 
 Participants. In advance of data collection, we decided to request 400 complete 
responses from MTurk participants (200 Americans in the US and 200 Indians in India). Of the 
408 people who began the study, four provided insufficient data for analysis. After applying 
Study 1’s a priori exclusion criteria, 378 people remained (186 Indians and 192 Americans).  
The Indian (vs. American) sample contained slightly younger people (Ms = 31.7 and 35.1 years, 
SDs = 11.1 and 8.5), t(375) = 3.25, p = .001, more men (78% vs. 53%), and more full-time 
employees (72% vs. 63%), but about the same number of people who relied on MTurk as their 
primary source of income (22% vs. 17%), C2s(1) = 27.97, 3.50, and 1.38, respectively; ps < .001, 
= .061, and < .241. Controlling for the significant demographic differences or retaining excluded 
participants did not alter the results’ significance (see Appendix S1 in the Online Supplement).  
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Procedure. Study 2 followed a similar procedure to Study 1. Participants read the 
vignette about an employee who gets pulled over for speeding (see Table 1). After completing 
the baseline moral condemnation and punishment measures from Study 1, participants learned 
the employee had previously led a safe-driving campaign as part of his job. To encourage 
reflection, participants wrote about why they thought the employee had led the campaign. Next, 
they indicated how generous or selfish they thought his reasons were for working on the 
campaign (-3 = Completely generous; +3 = Completely selfish), whether they thought he worked 
on it because we was more interested in helping himself versus helping other people (-3 = 
Entirely interesting in helping himself; +3 = Entirely interested in helping other people; reverse-
coded), and whether they thought he worked on it because he cared more about doing what was 
best for others versus doing what was best for himself (-3 = Only about others; +3 = Only about 
himself). We averaged these three items into a measure of explanations, with higher numbers 
indicating the employee’s reasons were more selfish (a = .81). Lastly, participants provided final 
ratings of moral condemnation and punishment, and answered a comprehension-check question. 
To simplify the design, Study 2 did not include additional vignettes. With fewer vignettes, there 
was only one attention check.  
Results and Discussion 
As expected, the results showed a cultural difference in how people explained the 
employee’s preaching, knowing he failed to practice it. Compared to Indians, Americans inferred 
that the employee had more individually oriented and selfish (vs. other-oriented and generous) 
reasons for preaching (MUS = 0.78, SD = 1.32; MIndia = 0.39, SD = 1.35), t(376) = 2.83, p = .005, 
d = .29. This cultural difference, in turn, predicted moral condemnation, consistent with our 
proposed mechanism (see Figure 2). That is, there was a significant indirect effect from culture 
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(dummy-coded: US = 1, India = 0), to selfish explanations for preaching, to final condemnation 
ratings, b = .16, bias-corrected 95% CI = [.049, .277] bootstrapped with 5,000 resamples (Hayes, 
2013). To isolate condemnation of misalignment from condemnation of the misdeed, this 
analysis controlled for the baseline condemnation ratings that participants had made of the 
misdeed before they learned about the misaligned preaching. We also found a significant indirect 
effect of culture, via explanations, on punishment (controlling for baseline punishment ratings), b 
= .13 [.059, .208].3 Together, these results are consistent with our claim that when a person fails 
to practice what he preaches, a greater tendency among members of a more-independent (vs. 
more-interdependent) culture to trace the preaching the selfish motives leads them to express 
greater moral condemnation and punitive sentiment. 
We also tested whether Americans reacted more negatively to misalignment than Indians 
overall. Following Study 1s’ analytic approach, we ran a mixed model predicting condemnation 
from effect codes for the country (USA = 1, India = -1) and time (final ratings = 1, baseline 
ratings = -1), plus their interaction, with random intercepts for participants (a model with random 
slopes for time failed to converge). The coefficient on the interaction was positive, as in Study 1, 
but not significant, b = .03, z = 1.32, p = .186, f2 < .01. When we tested punishment as the 
dependent measure, the interaction was not significant either, b = .01, z = .25, p = .800, f2 < .01. 
Perhaps this was because Study 2 (unlike Study 1) requested explanations for inconsistency 
before the dependent variable. That is, Study 2 made participants consider explanations that 
might not otherwise have been salient in their culture, which could have reduced cultural 
differences on condemnation and punishment. In any case, Study 2’s null interactions do not 
undermine Study 1’s results because these interactions were significant when we combined 
                                                
3 Due to missing data, ns = 377 and 376 for the mediation analysis of condemnation and 
punishment, respectively.  
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Study 1 and Study 2’s data, b = .13, z = 4.85, p < .001, f2 = .018 for the condemnation DV and b 
= .10, z = 3.29, p = .001, f2 = .013 for the punishment DV, with random slopes for time, a 
random effect for participant, and a fixed effect for study.  
 Together, Studies 1 and 2 thus provide initial support for our hypothesis that people react 
to word-deed misalignment with greater condemnation in an independently-oriented culture than 
in an interdependently-oriented culture because people in an independently-oriented culture are 
more likely to attribute such misalignment to self-serving (vs. other-oriented) motives.    
Study 3 
Study 3 made several adjustments to assess robustness and generalizability. It recruited 
participants from non-MTurk populations in the US, Japan, and Indonesia, employed different 
vignettes, and made culturally informed modifications to the condemnation measure. Participants 
read about a minor employee misdeed; depending on randomly assigned condition, the misdeed 
either did or did not contradict the employee’s prior preaching. Thus, Study 3 manipulated 
misalignment between subjects, which provides a more conservative test than Study 1 and 2’s 
within-subjects design. We predicted that the same misdeed would elicit greater condemnation 
when it was misaligned with prior preaching than when it was not, but that this effect would be 
stronger in the US (an independently oriented country) than in Japan or Indonesia (two 
interdependently oriented countries). 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 392 students from universities in one Western culture (the 
US, n = 118, 39% male, Mage = 23) and two Asian cultures (Indonesia, n = 162, 37% male, Mage 
= 19; and Japan, n = 112, 58% male, Mage = 22). In the US, subject pool members were emailed a 
survey invitation; in Japan and Indonesia, surveys were distributed in classes. Although Japan 
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and Indonesia differ in myriad ways – for example, in the religious beliefs of the majority of 
citizens, and in their level of economic development – both are more interdependently oriented 
than the US (see, e.g., Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2002). The number of participants available 
in an academic term determined the sample size before data analysis. We excluded non-citizens 
(6 in America, 14 in Japan, and 3 in Indonesia), and 12 people with incomplete responses, 
leaving a sample of 357. (The conclusions were identical, however, when non-citizens and 
participants with partially completed responses were retained; see Appendix S1 in the Online 
Supplement). 
Procedure. Participants completed Study 3 in their country’s dominant language after a 
scale validation study for an unrelated project.  
 Manipulation. Participants read a vignette about an employee who, as part of his job, 
preached against either smoking or reckless driving. Then while on vacation, he committed the 
misdeed of violating either a no-smoking or a safe-driving law himself. (See Appendix for 
vignette’s full text). Combining these materials created a misaligned preaching condition, in 
which he commits the same misdeed that he preached against, and a non-misaligned preaching 
condition, in which his misdeed is unrelated to his preaching. In a no preaching baseline 
condition, he worked on a publicity campaign that did not involve preaching, and then broke 
either the no-smoking or the safe-driving law. The design was thus a 3 (condition: misaligned 
preaching vs. non-misaligned preaching vs. no preaching) X 3 (culture: U.S. vs. Japan vs. 
Indonesia) factorial.  
 Measures. We modeled the dependent measure on the moral condemnation scale 
(Effron, et al., 2015; Effron & Monin, 2010), with two key differences from Studies 1 and 2. 
First, we made culturally informed changes to the items evaluating the employee. The kind of 
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person who deserves condemnation from an interdependent perspective is arrogant, makes others 
lose face, fails to treat others appropriately, and does not adapt him or herself to the demands of 
the social situation (Davidson, 2002; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Lebra, 2004). 
To capture these aspects of condemnation in Study 3, we asked participants to rate the employee 
on two semantic differentials from Studies 1 and 2 (Self-important/Humble, Mean/Nice) and two 
new ones (Critical/Understanding, Demanding/Accommodating). Participants also indicated how 
much they agreed the employee was a “morally upstanding person.” Second, following the 
original measure (Effron & Monin, 2010), participants rated the employee’s behavior on three 
semantic differentials (Perfectly OK/Extremely immoral, Honorable/Dishonorable, and Perfectly 
fine/Extremely wrong) and indicated how much they agreed that he committed a serious 
transgression. (Studies 1 and 2 omitted these items to minimize survey length). As in our 
previous studies, participants also indicated agreement that the employee should be punished. 
The items asking about agreement were measured on seven-point scales from Strongly disagree 
to Strongly agree.  
Following previous research (Effron, et al., 2015; Effron & Monin, 2010), we averaged 
the ten items into a moral condemnation scale, with positively worded items reverse-coded, and 
each item standardized separately in each culture because different items had different response 
scales and because the four semantic differentials rating the employee inadvertently had seven 
points in Japan and six points in the US and Indonesia. The composite displayed good reliability 
(as = .79, .73, and .89 in Japan, Indonesia, and the US, respectively).  
We also administered exploratory measures, which the Online Supplement lists in full 
(Appendix S2). 
Results and Discussion 
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If participants reacted negatively to misalignment, then they should express greater 
condemnation when misdeeds directly contradicted the employee’s preaching (misaligned-
preaching condition) than when there was no contradiction (non-misaligned preaching and no-
preaching conditions). The pattern of means supported this prediction, and, importantly, the 
effect of misalignment appeared larger in the US sample than the Asian samples (see Figure 3). 
Confirming that the manipulation affected condemnation differently in different cultures, 
there was a significant interaction in a 3 X 3 ANOVA (culture X condition), F(4, 348) = 6.42, p 
= .0001, f2 = .07. We assessed the magnitude and significance of the manipulation effects by 
testing, for each culture, the mean difference between the misaligned-preaching condition and 
the average of the other two conditions. That is, we calculated planned linear contrasts, coding 
the misaligned-preaching condition as +1 and the other two conditions as -.5, and computing 
standard errors based on the ANOVA’s residual (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). The results 
showed that misalignment increased condemnation in all three cultures, ps < .0004. However, 
consistent with our predictions, this effect’s magnitude was larger among Americans (d = 1.36) 
than among Japanese (d = .83) and Indonesians (d = .61). (See Table 3 for main and 
supplemental analyses). 
To test whether the effect of misalignment differed significantly across cultures, we 
computed differences in the linear contrasts described above (denoted by L; brackets contain 
95% CIs). Results confirmed that misalignment had a larger effect in the US compared to Japan, 
L = .32 [.01, .64], F(1, 348) = 4.14, p = .043, and compared to Indonesia, L = .43 [.15, .71], F(1, 
348) = 9.27, p = .003. The misalignment effect was statistically equivalent in Japan and 
Indonesia, L = .11 [-.18, .39], F(1, 348) = .52, p = .47.  
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Study 3 thus contributes additional support to our claim that word-deed misalignment can 
elicit greater condemnation in a culture characterized by independence than in cultures 
characterized by interdependence. Suggesting this effect is robust, we observed analogous results 
as in Study 1 despite different participant pools, national origins, vignettes, operationalizations of 
condemnation, and experimental designs. 
Study 4 
Having used lab methods to establish, conceptually replicate, and demonstrate a 
mechanism for our effect, we next assessed generalizability by testing our predictions in a field 
survey. Whereas participants in Studies 1-3 were MTurk participants or undergraduates judging 
fictional characters, Study 4 participants were recently-employed MBA students judging a real 
person from their lives: their former manager. Studies 1-3 adapted a paradigm commonly used in 
the psychology literature to assess reactions to misalignment: manipulating the misalignment 
between a character’s misdeed and his or her prior preaching, and measuring participants’ moral 
condemnation (e.g., Effron & Monin, 2010). Study 4 adopted the dominant paradigm used to 
assess reactions to misalignment in the organizational behavior literature: measuring employees’ 
perceptions of how chronically misaligned their manager’s words and deeds are, and examining 
how strongly these perceptions predict distrust of the manager (e.g., Simons, et al., 2007). In this 
literature, individuals perceived as chronically saying and doing different things are said to be 
low in behavioral integrity, or BI (Simons, 2002). 
Previous work established that Western employees distrust managers whom they perceive 
as low in BI, and that this distrust in turn leads such negative outcomes as poor employee 
motivation and performance and high turnover (for reviews, see Davis & Rothstein, 2006; 
Simons, et al., 2014). A recent investigation demonstrates that culture can play a role in how 
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much BI people ascribe to others, such that someone who breaks a promise is seen as lower in BI 
in the US than in Taiwan, Korea, and India (Friedman et al., in press). However, it is unclear 
from this previous work whether low BI is associated with distrust to the same degree in 
different cultures. Study 4 tested whether this association would be stronger in cultures that 
foster independence versus interdependence. To assess generalizability beyond East-West 
differences, we recruited participations from 46 nations that varied in independence. 
Study 4 also measured two other important cultural characteristics – power distance and 
tightness/looseness – to disentangle them from cultural independence, with which they are 
weakly to moderately correlated (Gelfand et al., 2011; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). In 
high-power-distance nations, less-powerful individuals expect and respect rigid hierarchies 
(Hofstede, et al., 2010). Respect for authorities could make employees in such cultures reluctant 
to express distrust of their managers, even if the managers displayed poor behavioral integrity. 
Compared to people in loose cultures, people in tight cultures have stronger social norms and are 
less tolerant of deviant behavior (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Mu, Kitayama, Han, & 
Gelfand, 2015). It is difficult to predict our hypothesized results a priori from 
tightness/looseness. On one hand, because different norms apply to different situations, people in 
tight (vs. loose) cultures could expect higher cross-situational variability of individual behavior, 
perhaps leading them to be less bothered by word-deed misalignment; on the other hand, people 
in tight (vs. loose) cultures could be more bothered by such misalignment, because they are more 
bothered by deviant behavior in general. Nonetheless, we tested whether the hypothesized effects 
of cultural independence would remain robust when accounting for tightness/looseness and 
power distance. 
Method 
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Participants. To fulfill a course requirement, all full-time and executive MBA students 
in an international business school’s introductory organizational behavior course completed an 
online survey, in which Study 4 was embedded. Of the 395 who provided sufficient responses 
for analysis, 15 did not consent to having their data analyzed for research, and we could not 
analyze 6 participants’ responses because we lacked data on their nation’s degree of 
independence. We excluded the 62 people who failed an attention check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, 
& Davidenko, 2009), described below, and the 84 who held multiple citizenships, because our 
theory does not make predictions about multicultural identities. (The results’ direction and 
significance was identical, however, when we retained inattentive and multicultural participants, 
except that the one marginally significant effect reported below became significant; see Online 
Supplement, Appendix S1). The final sample contained 228 students (197 full-time, and 31 
executive; 148 men, 80 women) from 46 nations. The independent nations tended to be in North 
America and Western Europe, whereas the interdependent ones were in Asia and Latin America 
(see Table 4). 
Behavioral Integrity. Participants first rated their most recent manager (or current 
manager, if applicable) on the 8-item BI scale, which assesses the degree of chronic alignment 
between words and deeds (sample item: “My manager practiced what he/she preached”; five 
response options ranged from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree; alpha = .94; Simons, et al., 
2007).  
 Trust. Seven items (taken from Mayer & Gavin, 2005; Simons, et al., 2007) measured 
trust (e.g., “If I had my way, I wouldn’t have let my manager have any influence over issues that 
are important to me;” a = .73; five response options ranged from Strongly disagree to Strongly 
agree). We chose these items because they have been used in previous BI research (Palanski & 
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Yammarino, 2011; Simons, et al., 2007). 
 Independence/Interdependence. Using a standard database of countries’ cultural 
characteristics (Hofstede, et al., 2010), we assigned an independence score to each participant 
based on the country in which he or she reported having lived the longest. Scores in our sample 
ranged from 12 to 91, with higher numbers indicating greater independence (M = 59.73, SD = 
25.34; see Table 4).4  
 Power distance. We assigned each participant a power distance score from Hofstede and 
colleagues’ (2010) database based on where he or she had lived the longest. Scores in our sample 
ranged from 11 to 104 (M = 54.79, SD = 19.92; see Table 4).  
 Tightness/looseness. We assigned participants a cultural tightness/looseness score 
corresponding to the nation where they had lived longest, based on data reported by Gelfand, et 
al. (2011). Because tightness data were only available for 27 of the countries in our sample, we 
could only assign scores to 178 participants. Scores in our sample ranged from 1.6 to 11.8 (M = 
6.74, SD = 2.31; see Table 4).  
 Organizational commitment. We also included a six-item measure of organizational 
affective commitment (sample item: “I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to this organization”, 
reverse-coded; response options ranged from -3 = Strongly disagree to 3 = Strongly agree; alpha 
= .87; Meyer, Allen, & Smith, 1993). In previous research, high-BI managers had more 
committed employees (Leroy, Palanski, & Simons, 2012). We explored whether this relationship 
would differ by culture, though our predictions were tentative because, compared to manager 
trustworthiness, feelings about an organization are more distal from manager BI (Leroy et al., 
                                                
4 We used data file version “2015 12 08” from http://geerthofstede.nl/research--vsm. We 
used individualism/collectivism as a proxy for independence/interdependence because 
individualistic societies foster interdependent models of self (Hofstede et al., 2010; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991).  
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2012). 
 Table 5 shows the correlations among the independent and dependent variables. The only 
other measures were unrelated to the hypotheses (e.g., decision-making problems for a class 
exercise). All materials were in English.  
Results 
To examine whether the relationship between trust and BI differed by culture, we 
regressed trust on BI and independence (both mean-centered), plus their interaction, in a mixed 
model with random intercepts for country, a random slope for BI, and an unstructured covariance 
matrix. Replicating previous studies, high-BI managers were trusted more, b = .40, z = 8.54, p < 
.001 (see Simons, et al., 2014), f2 = .14.5 Also consistent with prior work, people whose cultures 
emphasized independence (vs. interdependence) trusted their managers more overall, b = .005, z 
= 3.38, p = .001, f2 = .06 (see Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010). Most importantly, supporting our 
hypothesis, the relationship between BI and trust was stronger in independent than in 
interdependent cultures, as shown by a significantly positive interaction, b = .004, z = 2.42, p = 
.016, f2 = .02 (see Figure 4).  
To examine the nature of this interaction, we computed the simple slope of trust on BI 
across the full range of interdependence scores included in our sample. Although the relationship 
between BI and trust weakened as independence scores decreased, this relationship was 
significantly positive at both the highest and lowest score, representing, respectively, the USA 
(independence score = 91), b = .54, z = 7.00, p < .001, and Venezuela (independence score = 12), 
b = .19, z = 1.98, p = .048). 
                                                
5 Because we mean-centered the independent variables, simple effects are computed at the 
sample mean of the other predictors, and can thus be interpreted as main effects as in ANOVA. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  29 
We found no evidence that power distance or cultural tightness/looseness could explain 
these results. When we entered power distance (mean-centered) and its interaction with (mean-
centered) BI into the regression model, the interaction between BI and independence remained 
significant, b = .005, z = 1.98, p = .048.6 Neither power distance nor its interaction with BI were 
significant predictors, |b|s < .002, zs < .35, ps > .72. When we replaced power distance with 
cultural tightness (mean-centered), the interaction between BI and independence remained 
marginally significant, b = .005, z = 1.75, p = .081, and neither tightness nor its interaction with 
BI were significant, |b|s < . 02, zs < .82, ps > .41 (the sample size for this analysis was smaller 
because tightness scores were only available for 178 participants). Thus, our results appear 
driven by independence above and beyond power distance or tightness.  
We also found no evidence of cultural differences in the relationship between the 
managers’ BI and students’ organizational affective commitment b = -.006, z = 1.25, p = .210, f2 
< .01 . (Thirty-one participants did not respond to the commitment measure, leaving 197 for this 
analysis). Because a manager’s behavior is only one of many reasons why an employee would 
feel committed to an organization, this measure may have been too noisy to detect any cultural 
differences related to managers’ BI. 
Discussion 
 Across 46 nations, the more word-deed misalignment managers were perceived as 
displaying, the less their employees trusted them. As predicted, this relationship was stronger 
among people from the independently-oriented cultures of North America and Western Europe 
than among people from the interdependently-oriented cultures of Asia and Latin America. 
Previous theorizing would have predicted the reverse pattern based on the claim that 
                                                
6 The mixed model failed to converge using and unstandardized covariance structure, so we 
report results using an independent covariance structure. 
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predictability is a more important component of trustworthiness in interdependent than in 
independent cultures (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). Inconsistency makes a person’s 
behavior more difficult to predict, but – consistent with our theorizing – it fits better with the 
dominant model of self in cultures emphasizing interdependence.  
Because we measured, rather than manipulated, perceptions of misalignment, the usual 
caveats about correlation and causation apply. Nonetheless, Study 4 is the first to show that 
cultural differences the relationship between perceptions of misalignment and trust can be 
documented in real-world contexts with judgments of important individuals in participants’ lives. 
General Discussion 
Practicing exactly what you preach at all times may be an unrealistic goal, yet failing to 
do so can expose one to severely negative interpersonal reactions in Western cultural contexts. 
Our research suggests that misaligned practicing and preaching elicits less severe interpersonal 
reactions outside the West. In Studies 1-3, participants condemned someone more for the same 
misdeed when it represented a failure to practice what he preached than when it did not. 
However, misalignment had a larger effect on condemnation among Americans than among 
Japanese, Indonesians, or Indians. Across 46 nations in Study 4, the more interdependent a 
participant’s national culture, the less likely the participant was to distrust a manager for 
chronically “saying one thing but doing another.” Overall, then, we find that word-deed 
misalignment is more problematic in cultures that emphasize independence than in those that 
emphasize interdependence. 
 What explains these cultural differences? Study 2 found evidence that when someone’s 
practicing and preaching are misaligned, people explain the preaching differently depending on 
the prominent model of self in their culture. Americans imputed more selfish (and less generous) 
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intentions than Indian participants, which in turn predicted greater moral condemnation of the 
misalignment. Self-interested reasons for preaching (and not practicing) a value resonate with the 
independent model of self, and connote hypocrisy (Monin & Merritt, 2012) by suggesting that a 
person is feigning virtue. Other-oriented reasons are more salient in contexts in which the 
interdependent model is more practiced and in which normatively good actions require being 
receptive to important others (Markus, 2016). Where such relationships are thought to define the 
self, preaching (but not practicing) a value can signal that one wants to help others, not that one 
is feigning virtue.  
 Our results suggest that people in independent (vs. interdependent) cultures are less 
tolerant of word-deed misalignment in particular, but do not suggest they are less tolerant of 
wrongdoing in general. Participants in Studies 1–3 indicated how much they would condemn 
someone who committed a misdeed and who either had or had not previously preached against it. 
We found that the additional condemnation received for misalignment above and beyond the 
condemnation received for the misdeed was larger in independent than in interdependent 
cultures. The idea that people in independent cultures are less tolerant of wrongdoing cannot 
account for this finding.  
 For the same reason, our results do not simply reflect a general tendency to attribute 
wrongdoing to dispositions in the West and situations outside the West (Morris & Peng, 1994). 
For example, in Study 1, Indians expressed greater baseline moral condemnation of people who 
had committed misdeeds than Americans. It was only when participants learned that the 
misdeeds represented a failure to practice what they preached that Americans expressed greater 
moral condemnation than Indians (see Figure 1). If moral condemnation simply reflected 
dispositional attributions for wrongdoing, and if Americans were more likely than Indians to 
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make such attributions, then we should have instead observed Americans expressing greater 
condemnation than Indians even before they knew about the preaching. Thus, it is hard to 
explain the statistical interaction we observed solely based on cultural differences in a tendency 
to make dispositional attributions about wrongdoing. 
 However, a more nuanced explanation based on dispositional attributions could 
complement our proposed mechanism. Because people in Western cultural contexts typically 
expect words and dispositions to correspond (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), they may tend to 
interpret an act of preaching virtue as a claim of being virtuous (Effron, et al., 2015; Howe & 
Monin, 2017; Jordan, et al., 2017). For example, a manager who preaches the importance of 
charitable giving might be seen as claiming to have a charitable disposition. If she then declines 
to donate to charity, her preaching would in retrospect seem like an attempt to feign virtue – the 
hallmark of hypocrisy (cf. Batson, et al., 1999). By contrast, because people outside the West are 
more likely to expect words to reflect situations (Choi, et al., 1999), they may not tend to 
interpret preaching as a claim about dispositional virtue. In this view, acting uncharitably would 
not make preaching look like feigned virtue, and would thus not invite the same degree of 
condemnation or distrust as in the West. This potential role of situational attributions dovetails 
with our idea that preaching seems less selfishly motivated – less like feigned virtue – in cultures 
fostering independence. Investigating this potential role of attributions in judging misalignment 
would enrich our understanding of process. 
Theoretical Implications 
Theories in psychology, management, marketing, and political science assume that 
keeping your words and deeds aligned is essential to make a positive impression on others (e.g., 
Bhatti, Hansen, & Olsen, 2013; Cha & Edmondson, 2006; Effron & Miller, 2015; Hale & Pillow, 
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2015; Hennig-Thurau, Groth, Paul, & Gremler, 2006; Simons, 2002), especially in the moral 
domain (Kreps, Laurin, & Merritt, 2017). For example, aspiring leaders are told that success 
requires “walking their talk” (Kouzes & Posner, 2011; Simons, 2008). Our studies reveal for the 
first time that the importance – and even perceived morality – of such alignment depends on 
culture. The premium placed on consistency follows from a Western, independent model of self, 
whereas a premium placed on flexibility and privileging role requirements over personal 
preferences fits better with an interdependent model. People outside of Western culture do care 
about the congruence between words and deeds, but not as much. By incorporating the role of 
culture, these theories can better predict how people will be judged when they promote ideals 
that they do no privately hold or uphold. Word-deed misalignment may be “universally decried” 
in the literature (Simons, et al., 2007, p. 651), but it is not condemned as harshly all over the 
world. 
What counts as hypocrisy? Current theories offer little consensus (e.g., Alicke, et al., 
2013; Graham, et al., 2015; Hale & Pillow, 2015; Monin & Merritt, 2012). In our view, failing to 
practice what you preach is not sufficient to receive condemnation as a hypocrite, despite what 
some theories would suggest (e.g., Simons, 2002; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971). 
Instead, we argue that misaligned practice and preaching receives condemnation only when it 
signals that someone has been trying to appear more virtuous than he or she really is. If this idea 
is correct, then people should react most negatively to word-deed misalignment in contexts that 
support a sharp distinction between “how someone appears” and “who someone really is.” 
Supporting this prediction, we observed greater aversion to such misalignment in independently 
oriented cultures, which view public appearances as separate from the true self, than in 
interdependently oriented cultures, where the self is inextricably linked to relevant others’ views 
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and expectations, and thus to public behavior. In this way, our findings deepen understanding of 
what counts as hypocrisy. 
Our research also advances theories of morality and culture. Existing theories focus on 
cultural differences in moral practices and values (e.g., Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 2012), and 
the “moral foundations” on which these differences are built, such as care, fairness, loyalty, 
purity, and authority (Graham et al., 2013; see also Shweder, 1997). By contrast, we argue that 
cultures differ not only in their moral foundations, but also in how they respond to inconsistent 
behavior within a given foundation. For example, moral foundations theory (MFT) and its 
predecessors (Graham, et al., 2013; Shweder, 1997) would predict that because the “authority” 
foundation is more important in India than the US, disobeying a superior’s orders would receive 
harsher condemnation in India. However, our theory (and not MFT) would predict that 
Americans increase their condemnation more than Indians upon learning that someone who had 
disobeyed an order previously preached obedience (cf. Study 1). Thus, to understand how people 
will judge another’s morally relevant actions, it is important to consider not only whether the 
actions violated a culturally important moral value or foundation, but also to consider how 
cultures will view these actions in the context of the person’s previous behavior.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Our theoretical analysis focused on independence and interdependence. Study 4 found no 
evidence that power distance or cultural tightness/looseness could explain the results. However, 
it is possible that other cultural factors that tend to accompany interdependence contribute to 
these effects as well. For example, people in interdependent cultures tend to default to a dialectic 
style of reasoning (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000; Nisbett, et al., 2001; Oyserman & Lee, 2007), 
which promotes acceptance of contradictions, paradox, and inconsistency (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; 
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Zhang, Waldman, Han, & Li, 2015) – unlike the analytic style more prominent in independent 
cultures. Word-deed misalignment may be less problematic in interdependent contexts because it 
fits with the dialectic style. Testing the role of dialectical thinking would further enrich 
understanding of how culture shapes reactions to inconsistency. 
Future research should also examine whether reactions to word-deed misalignment 
depend on cultural diversities other than those that derive from national origin. For example, 
within the U. S., working-class backgrounds and many religious orientations (with the exception 
of main-line Protestantism) tend to foster interdependence (Markus & Conner, 2014; Stephens, 
Fryberg, & Markus, 2012). We would thus expect that people from U.S. working-class 
backgrounds and religious individuals who are not mainline Protestants would levy smaller 
penalties against word-deed misalignment (cf. Cohen & Rozin, 2001).  
It would also be interesting to examine whether culture shapes interpersonal reactions to 
word-deed misalignment besides moral condemnation and distrust. We measured condemnation 
and distrust because these outcomes were the focus of previous work on misalignment (e.g., 
Effron & Monin, 2010; Simons, 2002). However, we would expect similar effects of culture and 
misalignment on other interpersonal reactions. For example, in two follow-up studies (described 
in the Online Supplement’s Appendix S3), we found that in both the US and Japan, employees 
were more satisfied with supervision from managers whom they viewed as high (vs. low) in 
behavioral integrity. However, complementing Study 4, the relationship between behavioral 
integrity and satisfaction was significantly stronger in the US than in Japan, p = .011. 
As in much research, we operationalized culture at the country level, capturing national 
differences but not individual variations. Individual-level measures of independence and 
interdependence exist (e.g., Singelis, 1994), but are controversial (see Cross, et al., 2011), in part 
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because “cultural differences are not always reducible to individual differences” (Na, et al., 
2010, p. 6192). Individual-difference measures capture only limited elements of interdependence 
and interdependence (Vignoles, et al., 2016) because these models of self exist not only in 
individuals’ psychological tendencies, but also in pervasive ideas, institutional policies, 
organizations, norms, and everyday social interactions that afford these psychological tendencies 
(Markus & Conner, 2014). Moreover, research casts serious doubts on existing measures’ 
construct validity (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Kitayama, et al., 2009; Levine et 
al., 2003; Na, et al., 2010). For these reasons, we were not confident that individual differences 
in interdependence as assessed by available scales would mediate the national differences we 
observed. Nonetheless, new measurement advances could allow future work to test our 
hypotheses at the individual level (Vignoles, et al., 2016). 
Practical Implications 
The results have important implications for collaboration among people from diverse 
cultural backgrounds. For example, a Venezuelan manager may erroneously assume that her US 
employees understand that her role sometimes requires her to say one thing but do another, and 
not anticipate how much her behavior undermines her employees’ trust in her (cf. Study 4). 
Similarly, managers’ cultural backgrounds likely affect their judgments of employees when it 
comes to performance evaluations, promotion, and responses to employee wrongdoing. For 
example, a Western European manager may penalize Asian employees for misalignment that 
they did not anticipate would be problematic, such as comporting themselves outside the office 
inconsistently with the values they promote at work (cf. Studies 1–3). Although future research is 
needed to test these implications, our work raises the possibility that people may struggle to 
predict how negatively others will react to word-deed misalignment across cultures. Improving 
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these predictions could help people weigh the costs and benefits of prioritizing consistency over 
other social and moral concerns, such as the importance of tuning one’s words and deeds to the 
shifting demands of different social roles, audiences, or situations.   
Conclusion 
Our results document an important aspect of diversity with broad implications. Cultural 
differences in the importance of alignment between words and deeds could shape not only how 
people evaluate each other in everyday life, but also how the public reacts to corporate and 
political scandals, or how judges and juries punish wrongdoing. Our results highlight the 
potential for cultural misunderstandings and conflict surrounding issues of alleged hypocrisy. 
The condemnation you receive for failing to practice what you preach will depend on the culture 
in which you preach.  
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Open Practices 
 The exact materials administered in each study, including any measures included for 
exploratory purposes or for unrelated studies, can be found online at https://osf.io/xy4c6/. Please 
see the Online Supplement’s Appendix S2 for an explanation of Study 3’s exploratory measures.  
   
  
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  39 
References 
 
Alicke, M. D., Gordon, E., & Rose, D. (2013). Hypocrisy: What counts? Philosophical 
Psychology, 26(5), 673-701. 
Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less 
American. American Psychologist, 63(7), 602-614. 
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the 
structure of interpersonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4), 
596. 
Barden, J., Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2005). "Saying one thing and doing another": 
Examining the impact of event order on hypocrisy judgments of others. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(11), 1463-1474. 
Barden, J., Rucker, D. D., Petty, R. E., & Rios, K. (2014). Order of actions mitigates hypocrisy 
judgments for ingroup more than outgroup members. Group Processes and Intergroup 
Relations, 17(5), 590-601. 
Batson, C. D., Thompson, E. R., Seuferling, G., Whitney, H., & Strongman, J. A. (1999). Moral 
hypocrisy: Appearing moral to oneself without being so. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 77(3), 525-537. 
Bhatti, Y., Hansen, K. M., & Olsen, A. L. (2013). Political hypocrisy: The effect of political 
scandals on candidate evaluations. Acta Politica, 48(4), 408-428. 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 6(1), 3-5. 
Cha, S. E., & Edmondson, A. C. (2006). When values backfire: Leadership, attribution, and 
disenchantment in a values-driven organization. The Leadership Quarterly, 17, 57-78. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  40 
Choi, I., Koo, M., & Choi, J. A. (2007). Individual differences in analytic versus holistic 
thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(5), 691-705. 
Choi, I., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Cultural psychology of surprise: Holistic theories and 
recognition of contradiction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 890–905. 
Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation 
and universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125(1), 47. 
Church, A. T., Katigbak, M. S., Ibáñez-Reyes, J., de Jesús Vargas-Flores, J., Curtis, G. J., 
Tanaka-Matsumi, J., . . . Shen, J. (2014). Relating self-concept consistency to hedonic 
and eudaimonic well-being in eight cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 
45(5), 695-712. 
Cohen, A. B., & Rozin, P. (2001). Religion and the morality of mentality. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 81(4), 697. 
Cross, S. E., Gore, J. S., & Morris, M. L. (2003). The relational-interdependent self-construal, 
self-concept consistency, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
85(5), 933. 
Cross, S. E., Hardin, E. E., & Gercek-Swing, B. (2011). The what, how, why, and where of self-
construal. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15, 142-179. 
Davidson, R. J. (2002). Visions of compassion: Western scientists and Tibetan Buddhists 
examine human nature: Oxford University Press. 
Davis, A. L., & Rothstein, H. R. (2006). The effects of the perceived behavioral integrity of 
managers on employee attitudes: A meta-analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, 67(4), 407-
419. 
Doi, T. (1986). The anatomy of the self: The individual versus society. Tokyo: Kodansha. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  41 
Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., & Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the influence of national 
culture on the development of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 601-620. 
Effron, D. A., Lucas, B. J., & O'Connor, K. (2015). Hypocrisy by association: When 
organizational membership increases condemnation for wrongdoing. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 130, 147-159. 
Effron, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (2015). Do as I say, not as I’ve done: Suffering for a misdeed 
reduces the hypocrisy of advising others against it. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 131, 16-32. 
Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Letting people off the hook: When do good deeds excuse 
transgressions? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1618-1634. 
English, T., & Chen, S. (2007). Culture and self-concept stability: Consistency across and within 
contexts among Asian Americans and European Americans. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 93(3), 478. 
Ferrin, D. L., & Gillespie, N. (2010). Trust differences across national-societal cultures: Much to 
do, or much ado about nothing? In M. N. K. Saunders, D. Skinner, G. Dietz, N. Gillespie 
& R. Lewicki (Eds.), Organizational trust: A cultural perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Fiske, A. P., Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). The cultural matrix of social 
psychology. In D. Gilbert & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed.). 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Friedman, R., Hong, Y.-Y., Simons, T., Chi, S.-C., Oh, S.-H., & Lachowicz, M. (in press). The 
impact of culture on reactions to promise breaches: Differences between East and West in 
Behavioral Integrity perceptions. Group and Organization Management. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  42 
Gelfand, M. J., Nishii, L. H., & Raver, J. L. (2006). On the nature and importance of cultural 
tightness-looseness. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(6), 1225. 
Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., . . . Yamaguchi, S. 
(2011). Differences Between Tight and Loose Cultures: A 33-Nation Study. Science, 
332(6033), 1100-1104. 
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), 
21-38. 
Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral 
foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 47, 55-130. 
Graham, J., Meindl, P., Koleva, S., Iyer, R., & Johnson, K. M. (2015). When values and behavior 
conflict: Moral pluralism and intrapersonal moral hypocrisy. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 9(3), 158-170. 
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the 
moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366. 
Hale, W. J., & Pillow, D. R. (2015). Asymmetries in perceptions of self and others' hypocrisy: 
Rethinking the meaning and perception of the construct. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 45(1), 88-98. 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A 
regression-based approach. New York: Guilford. 
Heine, S. J., & Lehman, D. R. (1997). Culture, dissonance, and self-affirmation. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 389-400. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  43 
Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1999). Is there a universal need for 
positive self-regard? Psychological Review, 106(4), 766. 
Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Peng, K., & Greenholtz, J. (2002). What's wrong with cross-cultural 
comparisons of subjective Likert scales?: The reference-group effect. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychobgy, 82(6), 903-918. 
Hennig-Thurau, T., Groth, M., Paul, M., & Gremler, D. D. (2006). Are all smiles created equal? 
How emotional contagion and emotional labor affect service relationships. Journal of 
Marketing, 70(3), 58-73. 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 61-83. 
Hodges, B. H., & Geyer, A. L. (2006). A nonconformist account of the Asch experiments: 
Values, pragmatics, and moral dilemmas. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 
2-19. 
Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and organizations: Software of the 
mind (3rd ed.): McGraw-Hill. 
Hoshino-Browne, E., Zanna, A. S., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Kitayama, S., & Lackenbauer, 
S. (2005). On the cultural guises of cognitive dissonance: The case of Easterners and 
Westerners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(3), 294. 
Howe, L. C., & Monin, B. (2017). Healthier than thou?“ Practicing what you preach” backfires 
by increasing anticipated devaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
112(5), 718-735. 
Ji, L.-J., Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture, control, and perception of relationships in 
the environment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(5), 943. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  44 
Ji, L.-J., Zhang, Z., & Nisbett, R. E. (2004). Is it culture or is it language? Examination of 
language effects in cross-cultural research on categorization. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 87(1), 57. 
Jordan, J. J., Sommers, R., Bloom, P., & Rand, D. G. (2017). Why do we hate hypocrites? 
Evidence for a theory of false signaling. Psychological Science, 28(3), 189-202. 
Kannan-Narasimhan, R., & Lawrence, B. S. (2012). Behavioral integrity: How leader referents 
and trust matter to workplace outcomes. Journal of Business Ethics, 111(2), 165-178. 
Kitayama, S., & Markus, H. R. (1999). Yin and yang of the Japanese self: The cultural 
psychology of coherence. In I. D. Cervone & Y. Shoda (Eds.), The coherence of 
personality: Social cognitive bases of personality consistency, variability, and 
organization. New York: Guilford Press. 
Kitayama, S., Park, H., Sevincer, A. T., Karasawa, M., & Uskul, A. K. (2009). A cultural task 
analysis of implicit independence: Comparing North America, Western Europe, and East 
Asia. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(2), 236-255. 
Kitayama, S., Snibbe, A. C., Markus, H. R., & Suzuki, T. (2004). Is there any "free" choice? Self 
and dissonance in two cultures. Psychological Science, 15(8), 527-533. 
Kouzes, J. M., & Posner, B. Z. (2011). Credibility: How leaders gain and lose it; Why people 
demand it. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Kreps, T. A., Laurin, K., & Merritt, A. C. (2017). Hypocritical flip-flop, or courageous 
evolution? When leaders change their moral minds. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 113(5), 730-752. 
Kurzban, R. (2010). Why everyone (else) is a hypocrite. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  45 
Lammers, J. (2012). Abstraction increases hypocrisy. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 48(2), 475-480. 
Lammers, J., Stapel, D., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). Power increases hypocrisy: Moralizing in 
reasoning, immorality in behavior. Psychological Science, 21(5), 737-744. 
Laurent, S. M., Clark, B. A. M., Walker, S., & Wiseman, K. D. (2013). Punishing hypocrisy: The 
roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal 
and civil moral transgressors. Cognition and Emotion, 1-25. 
Lebra, T. S. (2004). The Japanese self in cultural logic. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. 
Leroy, H., Dierynck, B., Anseel, F., Simons, T., Halbesleben, J. R., McCaughey, D., . . . Sels, L. 
(2012). Behavioral integrity for safety, priority of safety, psychological safety, and 
patient safety: A team-level study. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97(6), 1273. 
Leroy, H., Palanski, M. E., & Simons, T. (2012). Authentic leadership and behavioral integrity as 
drivers of follower commitment and performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 107(3), 
255-264. 
Levine, T. R., Bresnahan, M. J., Park, H. S., Lapinski, M. K., Wittenbaum, G. M., Shearman, S. 
M., . . . Ohashi, R. (2003). Self-construal scales lack validity. Human Communication 
Research, 29(2), 210-252. 
Lillard, A. (1998). Ethnopsychologies: cultural variations in theories of mind. Psychological 
Bulletin, 123, 3-32. 
Malle, B. F. (1999). How people explain behavior: A new theoretical framework. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 3(1), 23-48. 
Malle, B. F. (2011). Time to give up the dogmas of attribution: An alternative theory of behavior 
explanation. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 44(1), 297-311. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  46 
Markus, H. R. (2016). What moves people to action? Culture and motivation. Current Opinion in 
Psychology, 8, 161-166. 
Markus, H. R., & Conner, A. (2014). Clash! How to thrive in a multicultural world. New York: 
Penguin. 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and 
motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224–253. 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2003). Models of agency: Sociocultural diversity in the 
construction of action. In V. Murphy-Berman & J. J. Berman (Eds.), Nebraska 
symposium on motivation (Vol. 49, pp. 1-58): University of Nebraska Press. 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2010). Cultures and selves. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 5(4), 420-430. 
Mayer, R. C., & Gavin, M. B. (2005). Trust in management and performance: Who minds the 
shop while the employees watch the boss? Academy of Management Journal, 48(5), 874-
888. 
Meyer, J. P., Allen, N. J., & Smith, C. A. (1993). Commitment to organizations and occupations: 
Extension and test of a three-component conceptualization. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 78(4), 538. 
Monin, B., & Merritt, A. C. (2012). Moral hypocrisy, moral inconsistency, and the struggle for 
moral integrity. In M. Mikulincer & P. Shaver (Eds.), The social psychology of morality: 
Exploring the causes of good and evil (pp. 167-202). Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  47 
Morling, B., Kitayama, S., & Miyamoto, Y. (2002). Cultural practices emphasize influence in the 
United States and adjustment in Japan. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
28(3), 311-323. 
Morris, M. W., & Peng, K. (1994). Culture and cause: American and Chinese attributions for 
social and physical events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 949-971. 
Mu, Y., Kitayama, S., Han, S., & Gelfand, M. J. (2015). How culture gets embrained: Cultural 
differences in event-related potentials of social norm violations. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 112(50), 15348-15353. 
Na, J., Grossmann, I., Varnum, M. E. W., Kitayama, S., Gonzalez, R., & Nisbett, R. E. (2010). 
Cultural differences are not always reducible to individual differences. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 107(14), 6192-6197. 
Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought: 
Holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108(2), 291. 
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation checks: 
Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45, 867-872. 
Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W.-S. (2007). Priming "culture": Culture as situated cognition. In S. 
Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.), Handbook of cultural psychology (pp. 255-279). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Palanski, M. E., Kahai, S. S., & Yammarino, F. J. (2011). Team virtues and performance: An 
examination of transparency, behavioral integrity, and trust. Journal of Business Ethics, 
99(2), 201-216. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  48 
Palanski, M. E., & Yammarino, F. J. (2011). Impact of behavioral integrity on follower job 
performance: A three-study examination. The Leadership Quarterly, 22(4), 765-786. 
Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (1999). Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction. 
American Psychologist, 54(9), 741. 
Polman, E., & Ruttan, R. L. (2012). Effects of anger, guilt, and envy on moral hypocrisy. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(1), 129-139. 
Powell, C. A. J., & Smith, R. H. (2012). Schadenfreude caused by the exposure of hypocrisy in 
others. Self and Identity, 1-19. 
Riemer, H., Shavitt, S., Koo, M., & Markus, H. R. (2014). Preferences don’t have to be personal: 
Expanding attitude theorizing with a cross-cultural perspective. Psychological Review, 
121(4), 619-648. 
Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. (1985). Contrast analysis: Focused comparisons in the analysis 
of variance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Savani, K., Markus, H. R., & Conner, A. L. (2008). Let your preference be your guide?: 
Preferences and choices are more tightly linked for North Americans than for Indians. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(4), 861-876. 
Schimmack, U., Oishi, S., & Diener, E. (2002). Cultural influences on the relation between 
pleasant emotions and unpleasant emotions: Asian dialectic philosophies or 
individualism-collectivism? Cognition and Emotion, 16, 705-719. 
Selya, A. S., Rose, J. S., Dierker, L. C., Hedeker, D., & Mermelstein, R. J. (2012). A practical 
guide to calculating Cohen’s f(2), a measure of local effect size, from PROC MIXED. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 1-6. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  49 
Shweder, R. A. (1997). The “big three” of morality (Autonomy, Community and Divinity) and 
the “big three” explanations of suffering. In A. M. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), Morality 
and Health. New York: Routledge. 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: Undisclosed 
flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. 
Psychological Science, 22(11), 1359-1366. 
Simons, T. (2002). Behavioral integrity: The perceived alignment between managers' words and 
deeds as a research focus. Organization Science, 13(1), 18-35. 
Simons, T. (2008). The integrity dividend: Leading by the power of your word. San Francisco, 
CA: John Wiley & Sons. 
Simons, T., Friedman, R., Liu, L. A., & McLean Parks, J. (2007). Racial differences in 
sensitivity to behavioral integrity: Attitudinal consequences, in-group effects, and "trickle 
down" among Black and non-Black employees. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(3), 
650. 
Simons, T., Leroy, H., Collewaert, V., & Masschelein, S. (2014). How leader alignment of words 
and deeds affects followers: A meta-analysis of behavioral integrity research. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 1-14. 
Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(5), 580-591. 
Stephens, N. M., Fryberg, S. A., & Markus, H. R. (2012). It's your choice: How the middle-class 
model of independence disadvantages working-class Americans. In S. T. Fiske & H. R. 
Markus (Eds.), Facing social class: How societal rank influences interaction (pp. 87-
106). New York: Russel Sage. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  50 
Stephens, N. M., Fryberg, S. A., Markus, H. R., Johnson, C. S., & Covarrubias, R. (2012). 
Unseen disadvantage: How American universities' focus on independence undermines the 
academic performance of first-generation college students. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 102(6), 1178-1197. 
Stephens, N. M., Hamedani, M. G., Markus, H. R., Bergsieker, H. B., & Eloul, L. (2009). Why 
did they “choose” to stay? Perspectives of Hurricane Katrina observers and survivors. 
Psychological Science, 20(7), 878-886. 
Stone, J., & Fernandez, N. C. (2008). To practice what we preach: The use of hypocrisy and 
cognitive dissonance to motivate behavior change. Social and Personality Psychology 
Compass, 2(2), 1024-1051. 
Suh, E. M. (2002). Culture, identity consistency, and subjective well-being. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1378-1391. 
Sverdlik, N., Roccas, S., & Sagiv, L. (2012). Morality across cultures: A value perspective. In M. 
Mikulincer & P. Shaver (Eds.), The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes 
of good and evil. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Tedeschi, J. T., Schlenker, B. R., & Bonoma, T. V. (1971). Cognitive dissonance: Private 
ratiocination or public spectacle? American Psychologist, 26, 685-695. 
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
UCLA Statistical Consulting Group. (n.d.). How can I estimate effect size for mixed models? 
Stata FAQ  Retrieved November 20, 2017, from https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/faq/how-
can-i-estimate-effect-size-for-mixed/ 
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2007). Moral hypocrisy: Social groups and the flexibility of 
virtue. Psychological Science, 18(8), 689-689. 
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  51 
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2008). The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moral hypocrite. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(5), 1334-1334. 
Vignoles, V. L., Owe, E., Becker, M., Smith, P. B., Easterbrook, M. J., Brown, R., . . . Bond, M. 
H. (2016). Beyond the "East-West" dichotomy: Global variation in cultural models of 
selfhood. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145, 966-1000. 
Zhang, Y., Waldman, D. A., Han, Y.-L., & Li, X.-B. (2015). Paradoxical leader behaviors in 
people management: Antecedents and consequences. Academy of Management Journal, 
58(2), 538-566. 
 
  
CULTURE AND HYPOCRISY  52 
Tables 
 
Table 1 
 
Full Text of Vignettes Used in Study 1 
 
	 	
Speeding	
	
Plagiarism	
	
Drug	use	
	
Part	I	
	
[Name1]	works	for	a	non-
profit	organization	whose	
goal	is	to	improve	the	
safety	and	wellbeing	of	
people	across	the	country.	
Recently,	while	on	
vacation,	[Name1]	was	by	
himself,	running	late	to	
meet	his	closest	friends	at	
dinner,	when	he	was	
pulled	over	for	driving	
nearly	[50	kilometers	/	30	
miles]	per	hour	over	the	
speed	limit.		
	
[Name2]	is	a	journalist	
who	works	at	a	
newspaper.	While	writing	
an	article,	she	copied	two	
sentences	word-for-word	
from	a	book	without	
giving	the	original	author	
credit.		
	
[Name3]	has	been	a	high	
school	teacher	for	the	
past	ten	years.	While	
traveling	outside	of	the	
country	on	vacation,	he	
was	caught	purchasing	
and	using	cocaine.	
	
	
Part	II	 A	year	before	the	incident	
you	just	read	about,	
[Name1]’s	boss	asked	him	
to	work	on	a	safe-driving	
publicity	campaign,	and	
[Name1]	agreed.	As	part	
of	the	campaign,	he	put	
together	advertisements	
about	the	importance	of	
driving	safely	and	lobbied	
the	government	to	
increase	penalties	for	
reckless	drivers.		
As	an	employee	of	the	
newspaper,	part	of	
[Name2]’s	job	is	to	lead	a	
week-long	workshop	to	
train	newly	hired	
journalists.	For	this	
workshop,	she	is	required	
to	emphasize	the	
newspaper’s	commitment	
to	honesty	and	integrity.	
She	always	tells	the	new	
journalists	not	to	copy	
other	people’s	work,	and	
that	the	penalties	for	
plagiarism	are	high.	
	
The	state	curriculum	
requires	[Name3]	to	teach	
her	students	about	the	
dangers	of	drug	use.	Thus,	
for	the	last	years,	[Name3]	
has	been	urging	his	
students	not	to	use	illegal	
drugs,	explaining	the	
health	risks,	and	informing	
them	of	the	legal	
consequences	of	using	
them.	
	
	
Note. Participants made baseline ratings after reading Part I, and final ratings after reading Part 
II. Name1, Name2, and Name3 were, respectively, Stewart, Andrew, and Paula in the US, and 
Suresh, Amit, and Priya in India. 
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Table 2 
Study 2’s Mixed Model Analysis 
DV: condemnation 
 b SE(b) z p 
(constant) 5.06 .08 64.08 < .001 
vignette     
    plagiarism -.33 .08 3.96 < .001 
    speeding -1.09 .08 12.98 < .001 
USA .03 .06 .46 .645 
time -.02 .04 .41 .685 
USA*time .22 .04 5.03 < .001 
DV: punishment 
 b SE(b) z p 
(constant) 5.03 .100 50.23 < .001 
vignette     
    plagiarism -.94 .10 9.22 < .001 
    speeding -1.07 .10 10.47 < .001 
USA -.20 .08 2.46 .014 
time .18 .04 4.24 < .001 
USA*time .17 .04 4.06 < .001 
 
Note. Plagiarism and speeding are two dummy codes for the three vignettes, with the drug-se 
vignette as a reference group (see Table 1). USA is coded 1 for USA and -1 for India. time is 
coded –1 for baseline ratings and 1 for final ratings. Random effects parameters omitted. 
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Table 3 
 
Contrast Analysis of the Condemnation Measure in Study 3 
 
		 		 		 		 		
Comparison		
Mean	
difference	 95%	CI	 d	 F	 p	
Misaligned	preaching	
vs.	average	of	
remaining	conditions	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
US	 0.50	 [0.36	 ,	 0.64]	 1.36	 48.37	 0.0001	
	
Japan	 0.29	 [0.13	 ,	 0.44]	 0.83	 13.74	 0.0002	
	
Indonesia	 0.22	 [0.10	 ,	 0.33]	 0.61	 13.02	 0.0004	
Misaligned	preaching	
vs.	no	preaching	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
US	 1.07	 [0.84 ,	 1.30]	 2.17	 71.95	 0.0001	
	
Japan	 0.69	 [0.43	 ,	 0.95]	 1.37	 24.77	 0.0001	
	
Indonesia	 0.34	 [0.14	 ,	 0.54]	 0.66	 11.20	 0.0009	
Misaligned	preaching	
vs.	non-misaligned	
preaching	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
US	 0.44	 [0.17 ,	 0.70]	 0.76	 12.44	 0.0005	
	
Japan	 0.17	 [-0.09	 ,	 0.43]	 0.33	 1.71	 0.1961	
	
Indonesia	 0.31	 [0.08	 ,	 0.54]	 0.53	 8.55	 0.0037	
	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
Note. ds and 95% CIs for each contrast were calculated based on pooled standard deviations of 
the specific cells tested by the contrast. Degrees of freedom for F-tests are (1, 348). 
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Table 4 
 
Countries Represented in Study 4 and Number of Participants in Each, Sorted by Independence  
 
Independence		
Power	
distance	
	
Tightness	 Nation	 n	 		 Independence		
Power	
distance	
	
Tightness	 Nation	 n	
12	 81	 3.7	 Venezuela	 1	 	 46	 49	 .	 Argentina	 2	
13	 67	 .	 Colombia	 4	 	 46	 54	 8.6	 Japan	 7	
14	 78	 .	 Indonesia	 1	 	 48	 77	 11.0	 India	 25	
16	 64	 .	 Peru	 4	 	 51	 57	 5.4	 Spain	 6	
18	 60	 10.0	 S.	Korea	 3	 	 54	 13	 3.1	 Israel	 5	
20	 80	 7.9	 China	 7	 	 55	 11	 6.8	 Austria	 1	
20	 74	 10.4	 Singapore	 3	 	 60	 30	 6.4	 Iceland	 1	
20	 64	 .	 Thailand	 2	 	 60	 68	 6.0	 Poland	 1	
23	 63	 .	 Chile	 2	 	 65	 49	 .	 South	Africa	 3	
25	 68	 6.3	 Hong	Kong	 1	 	 67	 35	 7.0*	 Germany	 11	
25	 92	 1.6	 Ukraine	 1	 	 68	 34	 .	 Switzerland	 2	
25	 90	 .	 UAE	 1	 	 70	 28	 .	 Ireland	 2	
27	 63	 7.8	 Portugal	 3	 	 71	 68	 6.3	 France	 7	
30	 81	 7.2	 Mexico	 1	 	 71	 31	 .	 Sweden	 2	
30	 80	 .	 Nigeria	 3	 	 74	 18	 .	 Denmark	 3	
30	 90	 .	 Romania	 2	 	 75	 65	 5.6	 Belgium	 4	
32	 94	 .	 Philippines	 1	 	 76	 50	 6.8	 Italy	 8	
35	 60	 3.9	 Greece	 1	 	 80	 39	 .	 Canada	 8	
37	 66	 9.2	 Turkey	 3	 	 80	 46	 2.9	 Hungary	 1	
38	 69	 3.5	 Brazil	 14	 	 80	 38	 3.3	 Netherlands	 1	
39	 45	 .	 Jamaica	 1	 	 89	 35	 6.9	 UK	 26	
39	 93	 .	 Russia	 3	 	 90	 36	 4.4	 Australia	 9	
40	 75	 .	 Lebanon	 3	 	 91	 40	 5.1	 USA	 28	
Note. Higher (vs. lower) numbers indicate greater independence (vs. interdependence), power distance, or tightness (vs. looseness).     
* We averaged the scores for former East and former West Germany from the Gelfand et al. (2011) data.
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Table 5 
Correlation Matrix for Study 4 
 
	 Measure	 1	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	1)	 BI	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	2)	 Independence	 -0.04	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	3)	 Power	Distance	 0.07	 	 -0.72	 **	 	 	 	 	 	 	4)	 Tightness	 -0.01	 	 -0.33	 **	 0.47	 **	 	 	 	 	
5)	 Trust	 0.52	 **	 0.14	 *	 -0.08	 	 -0.02	 	 	 	6)	 Commitment	 0.22	 **	 -0.17	 *	 0.11	 	 0.04	 	 0.17	 *	 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01. Due to missing data, N = 155 for the commitment/tightness 
correlation, N = 178 for all other correlations with tightness, N = 197 for all other correlations 
with commitment, and N = 228 for all remaining correlations.  
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Figures 
Figure 1 
Moral Condemnation (top panel) and Punishment (bottom panel) in Study 1 (M ± SE) 
 Note. Full range of variables on y-axes: 1-7. Ms and SEs derived from mixed model.  
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Figure 2 
Mediation Diagram for Study 2 
Culture affected condemnation for word-deed misalignment indirectly through how participants 
explained the misalignment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Analyses controlled for baseline condemnation of the relevant misdeed, measured before 
participants learned about the preaching. Coefficients are unstandardized. Values in brackets are 
the indirect effect’s 95% CI. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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.14 
 (total effect) 
-.01 
(direct effect) 
 US (1)  vs.  
India (0) 
 
Condemnation 
of 
misalignment 
Indirect effect: .16 [.05, .28]** 
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Figure 3 
Condemnation Measure’s Means ± SE in Study 3 
A larger effect of misalignment in the US than in Japan or Indonesia 
  
Note. Values in boxes, from top to bottom, are M, SD, and n. Each item on the condemnation 
scale was standardized separately in each culture before averaging. Thus, within-country 
comparisons are more informative than between-country comparisons. 
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Figure 4 
Interaction Between BI and Culture on Trust in Study 4: 
The relationship between BI and trust was stronger in independent countries than in 
interdependent countries.  
 
 
Note. The figure plots regression predictions at the highest and lowest independence scores in 
our sample. The line labeled “independent” corresponds to the USA’s independence score (91) 
and the line for “interdependent” corresponds to Venezuela’s independence score (12). 
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Appendix: 
Study 3’s Vignette 
 
Brackets indicate text that varied among conditions. The target person’s name was Mr. Smith in 
the US, Mr. Suzuki in Japan, and Mr. Bang Bang in Indonesia – common names in each country. 
 
Mr. Smith is a 37-year-old man. He works for a non-profit organization whose goal is to improve 
the wellbeing of people across the country. Mr. Smith puts together campaigns on various issues 
that are relevant to the non-profit’s mission. Recently, his boss asked him to work on an anti-
smoking [a safe-driving] [a publicity] campaign, and Mr. Smith agreed.  
 
Mr. Smith takes his job very seriously. Thus, for the last year, he’s been putting together anti-
smoking advertisements [safe driving advertisements] [advertisements for the organization], 
going to high schools to teach students about the dangers of smoking [about the dangers of 
reckless driving] [about the organization], and lobbying the government to increase penalties for 
smoking in public places [lobbying the government to increase penalties for moving violations] 
[lobbying grant-funding agencies to give money to his organization].  
 
Misaligned-preaching and non-misaligned preaching conditions only: When he is on the job, 
if he encounters individuals who smoke cigarettes [who say they speed regularly], Mr. Smith 
reprimands them, even if they only smoke socially or if they are already trying to quit [even if 
they only go a few miles per hour over the speed limit]. Mr. Smith reminds these people of how 
smoking and second-hand smoke [driving too fast] could cause them or others serious harm. Mr. 
Smith also believes that it is important for him and his colleagues to set an example xwhen they 
travel for work, and once reprimanded a co-worker for smoking on her break [for not obeying 
traffic rules].  
 
All conditions:  Recently, while on vacation, Mr. Smith was by himself when he was ticketed for 
smoking a cigarette in a public place where smoking was prohibited [Mr. Smith was by himself, 
running late to meet his closest friends at dinner, when he was pulled over for driving nearly 
thirty miles over the speed limit].  
 
 
 
